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Asynchronous and time-varying proximal type dynamics
in multi-agent network games
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Abstract— In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics
in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games.
These dynamics arise in different applications, since they
describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks,
e.g., in opinion dynamics, distributed model fitting and network
information fusion, where the goal of each agent is to seek an
equilibrium using local information only. We analyse several
conjugations of this class of games, providing convergence
results, or designing equilibrium seeking algorithms when the
original dynamics fail to converge. For the games subject only to
local constraints we look into both synchronous/asynchronous
dynamics and time-varying communication networks. For
games subject in addition to coupling constraints, we design
an equilibrium seeking algorithm converging to a special class
of game equilibria. Finally, we validate the theoretical results
via numerical simulations on opinion dynamics and distributed
model fitting.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation: Multi-agent decision making over networks
Multi-agent decision making over networks is currently a
vibrant research area in the systems-and-control community,
with applications in several relevant domains, such as smart
grids [1], [2], traffic and information networks [3], social
networks [4], [5], consensus and flocking groups [6] and
robotic [7] and sensor networks [8], [9]. The main benefit that
each decision maker, in short, agent, achieves from the use of
a distributed computation and communication, is to keep its
own data private and to exchange information with selected
agents only. Essentially, in networked multi-agent systems,
the states (or the decisions) of each agent evolve as a result
of local decision making, e.g. local constrained optimiza-
tion, and distributed communication with some neighboring
agents, via a communication network, usually modelled by a
graph. Usually, the aim of the agents is to reach a collective
equilibrium state, where no one can benefit from changing
its state at that equilibrium.
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B. Literature overview: Multi-agent optimization and multi-
agent network games
Multi-agent dynamics over networks embody the natural
extension of distributed optimization and equilibrium seeking
problems in network games. In the past decade, this field
has drawn attentions from research communities, leading to a
wide range of results. Some examples of convex optimization
constrained problems, subject to homogeneous constraint
sets, can be found in [10], where a uniformly bounded
subgradients and a complete communication graphs with
uniform weights are considered; while in [11] the cost
functions are assumed to be differentiable with Lipschitz
continuous and uniformly bounded gradients.
Solutions for nooncoperative games over networks subject
to convex compact local constraints have been developed
also in [12] using strongly convex quadratic cost functions
and time-invariant communication graphs; in [13] [14], using
differentiable cost functions with Lipschitz continuous gradi-
ents, strictly convex cost functions, and undirected, possibly
time-varying, communication graphs; and in [7] where the
communication is ruled by a, possibly time-varying, digraph
and the cost functions are assumed to be convex and lower
semi-continuous. Some recent works developed algorithms
to solve games over networks subject to asynchronous up-
dates of the agents: in [15] and [16] the game is subject
to affine coupling constraints, and the cost functions are
differentiables, while the communication graph is assumed
to be undirected.
To the best of the our knowledge, the only work that
extensively focuses on multi-agent network games is [2],
which considered general local convex costs and quadratic
proximal terms, time-invariant and time-varying communi-
cation graphs, subject to technical restrictions.
This paper aims at presenting and solving new interesting
problems, not yet considered in the context of multi-agent
network games and generalizing available results as high-
lighted in the next section.
C. Contribution of the paper
Within the litterature on multi-aegnt network games, the
most relevant works for our purposes are [12], [2] and [7],
the last being the starting point of this paper. Next, we
highlight the main contribution of our work with respect to
the aforementioned literature and these works in particular:
• We prove that a row stochastic adjacency matrix with
self-loops describing a strongly connected graph is an
average operator. Furthermore, we show this holds in
a Hilbert space weighted by the diagonal matrix, with
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entries being the elements of the left Perron Frobenius
eigenvector of that matrix. This is a general result that
we exploit for our proximal type dynamics.
• We establish the convergence for synchronous, asyn-
chronous and time-varying dynamics in multi-agent
network games, under the weak assumption of a com-
munication network described by a row stochastich
adjacency matrix. This weak assumption leads to several
technical challenges that in [2] are not present, since the
matrix is always assumed to be doubly stochastic, and in
[7] are solved by modifying the original dynamics. We
emphasize that in [2], [7], the asynchronous dynamics
are not considered.
• We develop a semi-decentralized algorithm seeking nor-
malized generalized network equilibrium, called Prox-
GNWE, converging to a solution of the game subject
to affine coupling constraints. Compared to the one
developed in [2, Eq. 28–31], Prox-GNWE requires a
lower number of communications between agents, and
it can also be applied to games with a wider class of
communication networks.
II. NOTATION
A. Basic notation
The set of real, positive, and non-negative numbers are
denoted by R, R>0 and R≥0, respectively; R := R ∪ {∞}.
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N. For a square
matrix A ∈ Rn×n, its transpose is denoted by A> and [A]i
denotes the i-th row of the matrix, and [A]ij the element
in the i-th row and j-th column. A  0 (A  0) stands
for a symmetric and positive definite (semidefinite) matrix,
while > (≥) describes an element wise inequality. A ⊗ B
is the Kronecker product of the matrices A and B. The
identity matrix is denoted by In ∈ Rn×n. 0 (1) represents the
vector/matrix with only 0 (1) elements. For x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn
and N = {1, . . . , N}, the collective vector is denoted
by x := col((xi)i∈N ) = [x>1 , . . . , x
>
N ]
> and x−i :=
col((xj)j∈N\{i}) = [x>1 , . . . , x
>
i−1, x
>
i+1, . . . , x
>
N ]
>. Given
the N matrices A1, . . . , AN , diag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes a
block-diagonal matrix with the matrices A1, . . . , AN on the
diagonal. The null space of a matrix A is denoted by ker(A).
The Cartesian product of the sets Ω1, . . . ,ΩN is described by∏N
i=1 Ωi. Given two vectors x, y ∈ Rn and a symmetric and
positive definite matrix Q  0, the weighted inner product
and norm are denoted by 〈x | y 〉Q and ‖x‖Q, respectively;
the Q−induced matrix norm is denoted by ‖A‖Q. A real
n dimensional Hilbert space obtained by endowing H =
(Rn, ‖ · ‖) with the product 〈x | y 〉Q is denoted by HQ.
B. Operator-theoretic notations and definitions
The identity operator is defined by Id(·). The indicator
function ιC : Rn → [0,+∞] of C ⊆ Rn is defined as
ιC(x) = 0 if x ∈ C; +∞ otherwise. The set valued mapping
NC : Rn ⇒ Rn stands for the normal cone to the set
C ⊆ Rn, that is NC(x) = {u ∈ Rn | sup〈C − x, u〉 ≤ 0} if
x ∈ C and ∅ otherwise. The graph of a set valued mapping
A : X ⇒ Y is gra(A) := {(x, u) ∈ X × Y |u ∈ A(x)}.
For a function φ : Rn → R, define dom(φ) := {x ∈
Rn|f(x) < +∞} and its subdifferential set-valued mapping,
∂φ : dom(φ) ⇒ Rn, ∂φ(x) := {u ∈ Rn| 〈y − x|u〉 +
φ(x) ≤ φ(y) , ∀y ∈ dom(φ)}. The projection operator
over a closed set S ⊆ Rn is projS(x) : Rn → S and
it is defined as projS(x) := argminy∈S‖y − x‖2. The
proximal operator proxf (x) : Rn → dom(f) is defined by
proxf (x) := argminy∈Rnf(y) +
1
2‖x − y‖2. A set valued
mapping F : Rn ⇒ Rn is `-Lipschitz continuous with ` > 0,
if ‖u − v‖ ≤ `‖x − y‖ for all (x, u) , (y, v) ∈ gra(F);
F is (strictly) monotone if for all (x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F)
〈u − v, x − y〉 ≥ (>)0 holds, and maximally monotone
if it there is no monotone operator with a graph that
strictly contains gra(F); F is α-strongly monotone if for all
(x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F) it holds 〈x− y, u− v〉 ≥ α‖x− y‖2.
JF := (Id + F)−1 denotes the resolvent mapping of F .
fix(A) := {x ∈ Rn|x ∈ F(x)} and zer(F) := {x ∈
Rn| 0 ∈ F(x)} denote the set of fixed points and zeros of
F , respectively. The operator A : Rn → Rn is η-averaged
(η-AVG) in HQ, with η ∈ (0, 1), if ‖A(x) − A(y)‖2Q ≤
‖x − y‖2Q − 1−ηη ‖(Id − A)(x) − (Id − A)(y)‖2Q, for all
x, y ∈ Rn; A is nonexpansive (NE) if 1-AVG; A is firmly
nonexpansive (FNE) if 12 -AVG; A is β-cocoercive if βA is
1
2 -AVG (i.e., FNE).
III. MATHEMATICAL SETUP AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
We consider a set of N agents (or players), where the
state (or strategy) of each agent i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N} is
denoted by xi ∈ Ωi ⊂ Rn. The set Ωi represents all the
feasible states of agent i, hence it is used to model the local
constraints of each agent. Throughout the paper, we assume
compactness and convexity of the local constraint set Ωi.
Standing Assumption 1 (Convexity): For each i ∈ N , the
set Ωi ⊂ Rn is non-empty, compact and convex.
We consider rational (or myopic) agents, namely, each
agent i aims at minimizing a local cost function gi, that
we assume convex and with the following structure.
Standing Assumption 2 (Proximal cost functions): For
each i ∈ N , the strictly-convex function gi : Rn × Rn → R
is defined by
gi(xi, z) := fi(xi) + ιΩi(xi) +
1
2‖xi − z‖2, (1)
where f¯i := fi + ιΩi : Rn → R is a lower semi-continuous
and convex function.
We emphasize that Standing Assumption 2 requires neither
the differentiability of the local cost function, nor the Lips-
chitz continuity and boundedness of its gradient. In (1), the
function f¯i is local to agent i and models the local objective
that the player would pursue if no coupling between agents is
present. The quadratic term 12‖xi−z‖2 penalizes the distance
between the state of agent i and a given z. This term is
referred to the literature as regularization (see [17, Ch. 27]),
since it leads to a strictly convex gi, even though the fi is
only lower semi-continuous, see [17, Th. 27.23].
We assume that the agents can communicate through a
network structure, described by a weighted digraph. Let us
represent the communication links between the agents by a
weighted adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N defined as [A]ij :=
ai,j . For all i, j ∈ N , ai,j ∈ [0, 1] denotes the weight that
agent i assigns to the state of agent j. If ai,j = 0, then the
state of agent i is independent from that of agent j. The set
of agents with whom agent i communicates is denoted by
Ni. The following assumption formalizes the communication
network via a digraph and the associated adjacency matrix.
Standing Assumption 3 (row stochasticity and self-loops):
The communication graph is strongly connected. The matrix
A = [ai,j ] is row stochastic, i.e., ai,j ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N ,
and
∑N
j=1 ai,j = 1, for all i ∈ N . Moreover, A has strictly-
positive diagonal elements, i.e., mini∈N ai,i =: a > 0.
In our setup, the variable z in (1) represents the average
state among the neighbors of agent i, weighted through
the adjacency matrix, i.e., z :=
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj . Therefore the
cost function of agent i is gi
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj
)
. Note that
a coupling between the agents emerges in the local cost
function, due to the dependence on the other agents strategy.
The problem just described can be naturally formalized as a
noncooperative network game between the N players, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N :
argminy∈Rn fi(y) +
1
2
∥∥∥y −∑Nj=1 ai,jxj∥∥∥2
s.t. y ∈ Ωi.
(2)
We consider rational agents that, at each time instant
k ∈ N, given the states of the neighbors, update their
states/strategies according to the following myopic dynamics:
xi(k + 1) = argmin
y∈Ωi
gi
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj(k)
)
. (3)
These dynamics are relatively simple, yet arise in diverse
research areas. Next, we recall some papers in the literature
where the dynamics studied are a special case of (3).
1) Opinion dynamics: In [18], the authors study the
Friedkin-Johnsen model, that is an extension of the
DeGroot’s model [19]. The update rule in [18, Eq. 1]
is effectively the best response of a game with cost
functions equal to
gi(xi, z) :=
1−µi
µi
‖xi−xi(0)‖2 + ι[0,1]n(xi)+‖xi−z‖2
(4)
where µi ∈ [0, 1] represents the stubbornness of the
player. Thus, [18, Eq. 1] is a special case of (3).
2) Distributed model fitting: One of the most common
tasks in machine learning is model fitting and in fact
several algorithms are proposed in literature, e.g. [20],
[21]. The idea is to identify the parameters x of a
linear model Ax = b, where A and b are obtained via
experimental data. If there is a large number of data,
i.e., A is a tall matrix, then the distributed counterpart
of these algorithms are presented in [22, Sec. 8.2]. In
particular, [22, Eq. 8.3] can be rewritten as a constrained
version of (3). The cost function is defined by
g(xi, z) := `i(Aixi − bi) + r(z) ,
where Ai and bi represent the i-th block of available
data,and xi is the local estimation of the parameters
of the model. Here, `i is a loss function and r is the
regularization function r(z) := 12‖xi − z‖. Finally, the
arising game is subject to the constraint that at the
equilibrium xi = xj for all i ∈ N . In Section VI-C,
we describe in detailed a possible implementation of
this type of algorithms.
3) Constrained consensus: if the cost function of the game
in (3) is chosen with fi = 0 for all i ∈ N , then we
retrive the projected consensus algorithm studied in [10,
Eq. 3] to solve the problem of constrained consensus. To
achieve the convergence to the consensus, it is required
the additional assumption that int(∩i∈NΩi) 6= ∅, see
[10, Ass. 1].
Next, we introduce the concept of equilibrium of interest
in this paper. Informally, we say that a collective vector x¯ ∈
Ω :=
∏N
i=1 Ωi is an equilibrium of the dynamics (3) of the
game in (2), if no agent i can decrease its local cost function
by unilaterally changing its strategy with another feasible
one. We formalize this concept in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Network equilibrium [2, Def. 1]): The col-
lective vector x¯ = col((x¯i)i∈N ) is a network equilibrium
(NWE) if, for every i ∈ N ,
xi = argmin
y∈Rn
gi
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj
)
. (5)
We note that if there are no self loops in the adjacency
matrix, i.e., ai,i = 0 for all i ∈ N , then an NWE corresponds
to a Nash equilibrium [2, Remark 1].
In the next section, we study the convergence of the
dynamics in (3) to an NWE for a population of myopic
agents. In particular, when the dynamics do not converge,
we propose alternative ones to recover convergence.
IV. PROXIMAL DYNAMICS
In this section, we study three different types of un-
constrained proximal dynamics, namely synchronous, asyn-
chronous and time-varying. While for the former two, we can
study and prove convergence to an NWE, the last does not
ensure convergence. Thus, we propose a modified version of
the dynamics with the same equilibria of the original game.
A. Unconstrained dynamics
As a first step, we rephrase the dynamics in a more
compact form by means of the proximity operator. In fact, the
dynamics in (3), with cost function as in (1), are equivalent
to the following proximal dynamics: for all i ∈ N ,
xi(k + 1) = proxf¯i
(∑N
j=1 ai,j xj(k)
)
, ∀k ∈ N. (6)
In compact form, they read as
x(k + 1) = proxf (Ax(k)) , (7)
where the matrix A := A ⊗ In represents the interactions
among agents, and the mapping proxf is a block-diagonal
proximal operator, i.e.,
proxf

 z1...
zN

 :=
 proxf¯1(z1)...
proxf¯N (zN )
 . (8)
Remark 1: The definition of NWE can be equivalently
recast as a fixed point of the operator (7). In fact, a collective
vector x is an NWE if and only if x ∈ fix(proxf ◦A). Under
Assumptions 1 and 2, fix
(
proxf ◦A
)
is non-empty [23,
Th. 4.1.5], i.e., there always exists an NWE of the game,
thus the convergence problem is well posed.
The following lemma represents the cornerstone used to
prove the convergence of the dynamics in (7) to an NWE. In
particular, it shows that a row stochastic matrix A is an AVG
operator in the Hilbert space weighted by a diagonal matrix
Q, whose diagonal entries are the elements of the left Perron-
Frobenius (PF) eigenvector of A, i.e., a vector q¯ ∈ RN>0
s.t. q¯>A = q¯>. In the remainder of the paper, we always
consider the normalized PF eigenvector, i.e., q = q¯/‖q¯‖.
Lemma 1 (Averageness and left PF eigenvector): Let
Assumption 3 hold true, i.e, A be row stochastic, a > 0
be its smallest diagonal element and q = col(q1, . . . , qN )
denotes its left PF eigenvector. Then, the following hold:
(i) A is η-AVG in HQ, with Q := diag(q1, . . . , qN ) and
η ∈ (0, 1− a);
(ii) The operator proxf ◦A is 12−η–AVG in HQ
If A is doubly-stochastic, the statements hold with Q = I .

Proof: See Appendix A.
Now, we are ready to present the first result, namely, the
global convergence of the proximal dynamics in (7) to an
NWE of the game in (2).
Theorem 1 (Convergence of proximal dynamics): For
any x(0) ∈ Ω, the sequence (x(k))k∈N generated by the
proximal dynamics in (7) converges to an NWE of (2).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 2: Theorem 1 extends [2, Th. 1], where the
matrix A is assumed doubly-stochastic [2, Ass. 1 Prop. 2]. In
this case, 1N is the left PF eigenvector of A and the matrix
Q can be set as the identity matrix, see Lemma 1.
Remark 3: In [2, Sec. VIII-A.] the authors study, via
simulations, an application of the game in (2) to opinion dy-
namics. In particular, they conjecture the convergence of the
dynamics in the case of a row stochastic weighted adjacency
matrix. Theorem 1 theoretically supports the convergence of
this class of dynamics.
The presence of self-loops in the communication (As-
sumption 3) is critical for the convergence of the dynamics
in (7). Next, we present a simple example of a two player
game, in which the dynamics fail to converge due to the lack
of self-loops.
Example 1: Consider the two player game, in which the
state of each agent is scalar and f¯i := ιΩ, for i = 1, 2. The
set Ω is an arbitrarily big compact subset of R, in which the
dynamics of the agents are invariant. The communication
network is described by the doubly-stochastic adjacency
matrix A = [ 0 11 0 ], defining a strongly connected graph
without self-loops. In this example, the dynamics in (7)
reduce to x(k + 1) = Ax(k). Hence, convergence does not
take place for all x(0) ∈ Ω.
If a = 0, i.e., the self-loop requirement in Standing
Assumption 3 is not satisfied, then the convergence can be
restored by relaxing the dynamics in (3) via the so-called
Krasnoselskii iteration [24, Sec. 5.2],
x(k + 1) = (1− α)x(k) + α proxf (Ax(k)) , (9)
where α ∈ (0, 1). These new dynamics share the same fixed
points of (7), that correspond to NWE of the original game
in (2).
Corollary 1: For any x(0) ∈ Ω and for mini∈N ai,i ≥ 0,
the sequence (x(k))k∈N generated by the dynamics in (9)
converges to an NWE of (3).
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Asynchronous unconstrained dynamics
The dynamics introduced in (7) assume that all the agents
update their strategy synchronously. Here, we study the more
realistic case in which the agents behave asynchronously,
namely, perform their local updates at different time instants.
Thus, at each time instant k, only one agent ik ∈ N updates
its state according to (6), while the others do not, i.e.,
xi(k + 1) =
{
proxf¯i
(∑N
j=1 ai,jxj(k)
)
, if i = ik,
xi(k), otherwise.
(10)
Next, we derive a compact form for the dynamics above.
Define Hi as the matrix of all zeros except for [Hi]ii = 1,
and also Hi := Hi ⊗ In. Then, we define the set H :=
{Hi}i∈N as a collection of these N matrices. At each time
instant k ∈ N, the choice of an agent which performs the
update is modelled via an i.i.d. random variable ζk, taking
values in H . If ζk = Hi, it means that agent i updates at
time k, while the others do not change their strategies. Given
a discrete probability distribution (p1, . . . , pN ), we define
P[ζk = Hi] = pi, for all i ∈ N . With this notation in mind,
the dynamics in (7) are modified to model asynchronous
updates,
x(k + 1) = x(k) + ζk
(
proxf (Ax(k))− x(k)
)
. (11)
We remark that (11) represent the natural asynchronous
counterpart of the ones in (7). In fact, the update above is
equivalent to the one in (6) for the active agent at time k ∈ N.
Hereafter, we assume that each agent i ∈ N has a public
and private memory. If the player is not performing an
update, the strategies stored in the two memories coincide.
During an update, instead, the public memory stores the
strategy of the agent before the update has started, while
in the private one there is the value that is modified during
the computations. When the update is completed, the value
in the public memory is overwritten by the private one. This
assumption ensures that all the reads of the public memory
of each agent i, performed by each neighbor j ∈ Ni, are
always consistent, see [25, Sec. 1.2] for technical details.
We consider the case in which the computation time for the
update is not negligible, therefore the strategies that agent i
reads from each neighbor j ∈ Ni can be outdated of ϕj(k) ∈
N time instants. The maximum delay is assumed uniformly
upper bounded.
Assumption 4 (Bounded maximum delay): The delays are
uniformly upper bounded, i.e., supk∈N maxi∈N ϕi(k) ≤
ϕ <∞, for some ϕ ∈ N.
The dynamics describing the asynchronous update with
delays can be then cast in a compact form as
x(k + 1) = x(k) + ζk
(
proxf (Axˆ(k))− xˆ(k)
)
, (12)
where xˆ = col(xˆ1, . . . , xˆN ) is the vector of possibly delayed
strategies. Note that each agent i has always access to the
updated value of its strategy, i.e., xˆi = xi, for all i ∈ N . We
stress that the dynamics in (12) coincides with (11) when no
delay is present, i.e., if ϕ = 0.
The following theorem claims the convergence (in prob-
ability) of (12) to an NWE of the game in (2), when the
maximum delay ϕ is small enough.
Theorem 2 (Convergence of asynchronous dynamics):
Let Assumption 4 hold true, pmin := mini∈N pi and
ϕ <
N
√
pmin
2(1−a) − 12√pmin . (13)
Then, for any x(0) ∈ Ω, the sequence (x(k))k∈N generated
by (12) converges almost surely to some x¯ ∈ fix(proxf ◦A),
namely, an NWE of the game in (2).
Proof: See Appendix B.
If the maximum delay does not satisfy (13), then the conver-
gence of the dynamics in (12) is not guaranteed. In this case,
convergence can be restored by introducing a time-varying
scaling factor ψk in the dynamics:
x(k + 1) = x(k) + ψkζk
(
proxf (Axˆ(k))− xˆ(k)
)
. (14)
The introduction of this scaling factor, always smaller than
1, leads to a slower convergence of (14) with respect to
(12), since it implies a smaller step size in update. The next
theorem proves that, the modified dynamics converges if the
scaling factor is chosen small enough.
Theorem 3: Let Assumption 4 hold true and set
0 < ψk <
Npmin
(2ϕ
√
pmin+1)(1−a) , ∀k ∈ N.
Then, for any x(0) ∈ Ω, the sequence (x(k))k∈N generated
by (14) converges almost surely to some x¯ ∈ fix(proxf ◦A),
namely, an NWE of the game in (2).
Proof: See Appendix B.
C. Time-varying unconstrained dynamics
A challenging problem related to the dynamics in (7) is
studying its convergence when the communication network
is time-varying (i.e., the associated adjacency matrix A is
time dependent). In this case, the update rules in (7) become
x(k + 1) = proxf (A(k)x(k)) , (15)
where A(k) = A(k)⊗ In and A(k) is the adjacency matrix
at time instant k.
Next, we assume persistent stochasticity of the sequence
(A(k))k∈N, that can be seen as the time-varying counterpart
of Standing Assumption 3. Similar assumptions can be found
in several other works over time-varying graphs, e.g., [26,
Ass. 1], [2, Ass. 4,5], [10, Ass. 2,3].
Assumption 5 (Persistent row stochasticity and self-loops):
For all k ∈ N, the adjacency matrix A(k) is row stochastic
and describes a strongly connected graph. Furthermore,
there exists k ∈ N such that, for all k > k, the matrix A(k)
satisfies infk>k mini∈N [A(k)]ii =: a > 0.
The concept of NWE in Definition 1 is bound to the
particular communication network considered. In the case
of a time-varying communication topology, we focus on a
different class of equilibria, namely, those invariant with
respect to changes in the communication topology.
Definition 2 (Persistent NWE [2, Ass. 3] ): A collective
vector x¯ is a persistent NWE (p-NWE) of (15) if there exists
some positive constant k > 0, such that
x¯ ∈ E := ∩k>k fix
(
proxf (A(k)x(k))
)
. (16)
Next, we assume the existence of a p-NWE.
Assumption 6 (Existence of a p-NWE): The set of p-
NWE of (15) is non-empty, i.e., E 6= ∅.
We note that if the operators proxf¯1 , proxf¯2 , . . . , proxf¯N
have at least one common fixed point, our convergence
problem boils down to the setup studied in [27]. In this case,
[27, Th. 2] can be applied to the dynamics in (15) to prove
convergence to a p-NWE, x¯ = 1⊗x, where x¯ is a common
fixed point of the proximal operators proxfi ’s. However, if
this additional assumption is not met, then convergence is
not directly guaranteed. In fact, even though at each time
instant the update in (15) describes converging dynamics,
the convergence of the overall time-varying dynamics is not
proven for every switching signal, see e.g. [28, Part II].
Since A(k) satisfies Standing Assumption 3 for all k,
we can apply the same reasoning adopted in the proof of
Theorem 1 to show that every mapping proxf ◦ A(k) is
AVG in a particular space HQ(k), where in general Q(k)
is different at different time instants. A priori, there is not
a common space in which the AVG propriety holds for all
the mappings, thus we cannot infer the convergence of the
dynamics in (15) under arbitrary switching signals. In some
particular cases, a common space can be found, e.g., if all
the adjacency matrices are doubly stochastic, then the time-
varying dynamics converge in the space HI , see [2, Th. 3].
To address the more general case with row stochastic
adjacency matrices, we propose modified dynamics with
convergence guarantees to a p-NWE, for every switching
sequence, i.e.,
x(k + 1) = proxf
(
[I +Q(k)(A(k)− I)]x(k)) . (17)
These new dynamics are obtained by replacing A(k) in
(15) with I + Q(k)(A(k) − I), where Q(k) is chosen as
in Theorem 1. Remarkably, this key modification makes
the resulting operators
(
proxf ◦
(
I +Q(k)(A(k)− I)))
k∈N
averaged in the same space, i.e., HI , for all A(k) satisfying
Assumption 3, as explained in Appendix C. Moreover, the
change of dynamics does not lead to extra communications
between the agents, since the matrix Q(k) is block diagonal.
The following theorem represents the main result of this
section and shows that the modified dynamics in (17), subject
to arbitrary switching of communication topology, converge
to a p-NWE of the game in (15), for any initial condition.
Theorem 4 (Convergence of time-varying dynamics): Let
Assumptions 5, 6 hold true. Then, for any x(0) ∈ Ω, the
sequence (x(k))k∈N generated by (17) converges to a point
x¯ ∈ E , with E as in (16), namely, a p-NWE of (15).
Proof: See Appendix C.
We clarify that in general, the computation of Q(k)
associated to each A(k) requires global information on the
communication network. Therefore, this solution is suitable
for the case of switching between a finite set of adjacency
matrices, for which the associated matrices Q(k) can be
computed offline.
Nevertheless, for some network structures the PF eigen-
vector is known or it can be explicitly computed locally. For
example, if the matrix A(k) is symmetric, hence doubly-
stochastic, or if each agent i knows the weight that its neigh-
bours assign to the information he communicates, the i-the
component of q(k) can be computed as limt→∞[A(k)>]tix =
qi(k), for any x ∈ RN [29, Prop. 1.68]. Moreover, if
each agent i has the same out and in degree, denoted by
di(k), and the weights in the adjacency matrix are chosen
as [A(k)]ij = 1di(k) , then the left PF eigenvector is q(k) :=
col((di(k)/
∑N
j=1 dj(k))i∈N ). In other words, in this case
each agent must only know its out-degree to compute its
component of q(k).
V. PROXIMAL DYNAMICS UNDER COUPLING
CONSTRAINTS
A. Problem formulation
In this section, we consider a more general setup in which
the agents in the game, not only are subject to local con-
straints, but also to M affine separable coupling constraints.
Thus, let us consider the collective feasible decision set
X := Ω ∩ {x ∈ RnN |Cx ≤ c} (18)
where C ∈ RM×nN and c ∈ RM . For every agent i ∈ N ,
the set of points satisfying the coupling constraints reads as
Xi(x−i) :=
{
y ∈ Rn |Ciy +
∑N
j=1
j 6=i
Cjxj ≤ c
}
. (19)
Standing Assumption 7: For all i ∈ N , the local feasible
decision set Ωi ∩ Xi(x−i) satisfies Slater’s condition.
The original game formulation in (2) changes to consider
also the coupling constraints, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N :
argminy∈Rn f¯i(y) +
1
2
∥∥∥y −∑Nj=1 ai,jxj∥∥∥2
s.t. y ∈ Xi(x−i).
(20)
Hence the correspondent myopic dynamics read as
xi(k + 1) = argmin
y∈Xi(x−i(k))
gi
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj(k)
)
. (21)
The concept of NWE (Definition 1) can be naturally extended
for the case of network games with coupling constraints, as
formalized next.
Definition 3 (Generalized Network Equilibrium): A col-
lective vector x is a generalized network equilibrium
(GNWE) for the game in (20) if, for every i ∈ N ,
xi = argmin
y∈Xi(x−i)
gi
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj
)
.
The following example shows that the dynamics in (3) fail
to converge even for simple coupling constraints.
Example 2: Consider a 2-player game, defined as in (20),
where, for i ∈ {1, 2}, xi ∈ R and the local feasible decision
set is defined as Xi(u) := {v ∈ R |u+v = 0} = {−u}. The
game is jointly convex since the collective feasible decision
set is described by the convex set X := {x ∈ R2 |x1 +
x2 = 0}. The parallel myopic best response dynamics are
described in closed form as the discrete-time linear system:[
x1(k + 1)
x2(k + 1)
]
=
[
0 −1
−1 0
] [
x1(k)
x2(k)
]
, (22)
which is not globally convergent, e.g., consider x1(0) =
x2(0) = 1.
The myopic dynamics of the agents fail to converge, thus
we rephrase them into some analogues pseudo-collaborative
ones. In fact, the players aim to minimize their local cost
function, while at the same time coordinate with the other
agents to satisfy the coupling constraints. Toward this aim,
we first dualize the problem and transform it in an auxiliary
(extended) network game [30, Ch. 3]. Finally, we design a
semi-decentralized iterative algorithm that ensure the conver-
gence of these dynamics to a GNWE.
Let us now introduce the dual variable λi ∈ RM≥0 for each
player i ∈ N , and define the concept of extended network
equilibrium arising from this new problem structure.
Definition 4 (Extended Network Equilibrium): The pair
(x,λ), is an Extended Network Equilibrium (ENWE) for
the game in (20) if, for every i ∈ N , it satisfies
xi = argmin
y∈Rn
gi
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj
)
+ λ
>
i Ciy, (23a)
λi = argmin
ξ∈RM≥0
−ξ>(Cx− c) . (23b)
To find an ENWE of the game in (20), we assume the
presence of a central coordinator. It broadcasts to all agents
an auxiliary variable σ that each agent i uses to compute
its local dual variable λi. Namely, every agent i applies a
scaling factor αi ∈ [0, 1] to σ to attain its dual variable,
i.e. λi = αi σ. The values of the scaling factor represent a
split of the burden that the agents experience to satisfy the
constraints, hence
∑N
i=1 αi = 1. These game equilibrium
problems were studied for the first time in the seminal work
of Rosen [31], where the author introduces the notion of
normalized equilibrium. We specialize this equilibrium idea
for the problem at hand, introducing the notion of normalized
extended network equilibrium (n-ENWE).
Definition 5 (normalized-ENWE): The pair (x, σ), is a
normalized-Extended Network Equilibrium (n-ENWE) for
the game in (20), if for all i ∈ N it satisfies
xi = argmin
y∈Rn
gi
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,jxj
)
+ αi σ
>Ciy, (24a)
σ = argmin
ς∈RM≥0
−ς>(Cx− c), (24b)
where αi > 0.
From (24a) – (24b), one can see that the class of n-ENWE
is a particular instance of ENWE and, at the same time, a
generalization of the case in which all the agents adopt the
same dual variable, hence αi = 1/M , for all i ∈ N . This
latter case is widely studied in literature, since describes a
fair split between the agents of the burden to satisfy the
constraints [32], [33].
Next, we recast the n-ENWE described by the two inclu-
sions (24a) – (24b) as a fixed point of a suitable mappings. In
fact, (24a) can be equivalently rewritten as x = proxf (Ax−
ΛC>σ), where Λ = diag((αi)i∈N )⊗ In, while (24b) holds
true if and only if σ = projRM (σ + Cx− c).
To combine in a single operator (24a) and (24b), we first
introduce two mappings, i.e.,
R := diag(proxf , projRM≥0) (25)
and the affine mapping G : RnN+M → RnN+M defined as
G(·) := G ·+
[
0
c
]
:=
[
A −ΛC>
C I
]
· −
[
0
c
]
. (26)
The composition of these two operators provides a compact
definition of n-ENWE for the game in (20). In fact, a point
(x, σ) is an n-ENWE if and only if col(x, σ) ∈ fix(R ◦G),
indeed the explicit computation of R ◦ G leads directly to
(24a) and (24b).
The following lemmas show that an n-ENWE is also a
GNWE by proving that a fixed point of R ◦G is a GNWE.
Lemma 2 (GNWE as fixed point): Let Assumption 7 hold
true. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) x is a GNWE for the game in (20);
(ii) ∃σ ∈ RM such that col(x, σ) ∈ fix(R ◦ G).
Lemma 3 (Existence of a GNWE): Let Assumption 7
hold true. It always exists a GNWE for the game in (20).
The two lemmas above are direct consequences of [2,
Lem. 2, Prop. 2] respectively, so the proofs are omitted.
B. Algorithm derivation (Prox-GNWE)
In this section, we derive an iterative algorithm seeking n-
GNWE (Prox-GNWE) for the game in (20). The set of fixed
points of the operator R ◦ G can be expressed as the set of
zeros of other suitable operators, as formalized next.
Lemma 4 ([24, Prop. 26.1 (iv)]): Let B := F × NRM≥0 ,
with F :=
∏N
i=1 ∂f¯i. Then, fix (R ◦ G) =
zer (B + Id− G).
Several algorithms are available in the literature to find a
zero of the sum of two monotone operators, the most com-
mon being presented in [17, Ch. 26]. We opted for a variant
of the preconditioned proximal-point algorithm (PPP) that
allows for non self-adjoint preconditioning [34, Eq. 4.18]. It
results in proximal type update with inertia, that resemble the
original myopic dynamics studied. The resulting algorithm
is here called Prox-GNWE and it is described in (27a) –
(27d) where, for all the variables introduced, we adopted
the notation x+ := x(k + 1) and x = x(k), for the sake
of compactness. It is composed of three main steps: a local
gradient descend (27a), done by each agent, a gradient ascend
(27b), performed by the coordinator, and finally an inertia
step (27c) – (27d).
The parameters Prox-GNWE are chosen such that the
following inequalities are satisfied:
ri − ai,i < δ−1i ≤ γ−1 − ri − ai,i, ∀i ∈ N , (28)
pj < β ≤ γ−1 − pj ,
where
ri :=
1
2
∑N
j=1
j 6=i
(ai,j + aji) + (1 + αi)‖C>i ‖∞,
pj :=(1 + αi) max
j∈{1,...,N}
‖C>j ‖∞ .
(29)
We note that, if γ is chosen small enough, then the right
inequalities in (28) always hold. On the other hand, γ is the
step size of the algorithm, thus a smaller value can affect the
convergence speed. The formal derivation of these bounds is
reported in Appendix D.
We also note that (27a) – (27d) require two communication
between an agent i and its neighbours one to obtain the
value of xj(k) in (27a) and the second to gather x˜j(k) for
all j ∈ Ni in (27c). Finally, we conclude the section by
establishing global convergence of the sequence generated
by Prox-GNWE to a GNWE of the game in (20).
Theorem 5 (Convergence Prox-GNWE): Set αi = qi, for
all i ∈ N , with qi as in Theorem 1, and choose δi, β, γ
satisfying (28). Then, for any initial condition, the sequence
(x(k))k∈N generated by (27a) – (27d), converges to a GNWE
of the game in (20).
Proof: See Appendix E.
∀i ∈ N : x˜i = prox δi
δi+1
f¯i
(
δi
δi+1
(
1
δi
xi +
∑N
j=1ai,jxj − αiC>i σ
))
(27a)
σ˜ = projRM≥0
(
σ + 1β (Cx− c)
)
(27b)
∀i ∈ N : x+i = xi + γ
[
δi(x˜i − xi) +
∑N
j=1 ai,j(x˜j − xj)− αiC>i (σ˜ − σ)
]
(27c)
σ+ = σ + γ [β(σ˜ − σ) + C(x˜− x)] (27d)
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
A. Synchronous/asynchronous Friedkin and Johnsen model
As mentioned in Section III, the problem studied in this
paper arises often in the field of opinion dynamics. In
this first simulation, we consider the standard Friedkin and
Johnsen model, introduced in [35]. The strategy xi(k) of
each player represents its opinion on n independent topics
at time k. An opinion is represented with a value between
0 and 1, hence Ωi := [0, 1]n. The opinion [xi]j = 1 if
agent i completely agrees on topic j, and vice versa. Each
agent is stubborn with respect to its initial opinion xi(0) and
µi ∈ [0, 1] defines how much its opinion is bound to it, e.g.,
if µi = 0 the player is a follower on the other hand if µi = 1
it is fully stubborn. In the following, we present the evolution
of the synchronous and asynchronous dynamics (7) and (12),
respectively, where the cost function is as in (4).
We considered N = 10 agents discussing on n = 3 topics.
The communication network and the weights that each agent
assigns to the neighbours are randomly drawn, with the only
constraint of satisfying Assumption 3. The initial condition
is also a random vector x(0) ∈ [0, 1]nN . Half of the players
are somehow stubborn µ = 0.5 and the remaining are more
incline to follow the opinion of the others, i.e., µ = 0.1. For
the asynchronous dynamics, we consider three scenarios.
(A1) There is no delay in the information and the probability
of update is uniform between the players, hence ϕ = 0
and pmin = 1/N = 0.1.
(A2) There is no delayed information and the update prob-
ability is defined accordingly to a random probability
vector p, so ϕ = 0 and pmin = 0.0191. In particular,
we consider the case of a very skewed distribution to
highlight the differences with respect to (A1) and (A3).
(A3) We consider an uniform probability of update and a
maximum delay of two time instants, i.e., pmin =
1/N = 0.1 and ϕ = 2. The values of the maximum
delay is chosen in order to fulfil condition (13).
(A4) In this case, we consider the same setup as in (A3) but
in this case the maximum delay is ϕ = 50. Notice that
the theoretical results do not guarantee the convergence
of these dynamics.
In Figure 1 it can be seen how the convergence of the
synchronous dynamics and the asynchronous ones, in the
conditions (A2), (A3), is similar. The delay affects the
convergence speed if it surpass the theoretical upper bound in
(13), as in (A4). It is worthy to notice that, even a big delay,
does not seem to lead to instability, while it can produce
a sequence that does not converge monotonically to the
Fig. 1: Comparison between the convergence of the Friedkin
and Johnsen model subject to synchronous and asynchronous
update. In the latter case the different type of updates (A1),
(A2), (A3) and (A4) are considered. For a fair comparison
we have assumed that the synchronous dynamics update once
every N time instants.
equilibrium, see the zoom in Fig. 1. The slowest convergence
is obtained in the case of a non uniform probability of update,
i.e., (A2). From the simulation it seems that the uniform
update probability produces always the fastest convergence.
In fact, the presence of agents updating with a low probability
produces some plateau in the convergence of the dynamics.
B. Time-varying DeGroot model with bounded confidence
In this section, we consider a modified time varying ver-
sion of the DeGroot model [19], where each agent is willing
to change its opinion up to a certain extent. This model can
describe the presence of extremists in a discussion. In the
DeGroot model, the cost function of the game in (2) f¯i,
reduces to f¯i = ιΩi for all i ∈ N . We consider N = 8
agents discussing on one topic, hence the state xi is a scalar.
The agents belong to three different categories, that we call:
positive extremists, negative extremists and neutralists. This
classification is based on the local feasible decision set.
• Positive (negative) extremists: the agents agree (dis-
agree) with the topic and are not open to drastically
change their opinion, i.e., Ωi = [0.75, 1] (Ωi =
[0, 0.25]).
• Neutralists: the agents do not have a strong opinion
on the topic, so their opinions vary from 0 to 1, i.e.,
Ωi = [0, 1].
Our setup is composed of two negative extremists (agent 1
and 2), four neutralists (agents 3-6) and two positive extrem-
ists (agents 6 and 8). We assume that, at each time instant,
the agents can switch between three different communication
network topologies, depicted in Figure 2. The dynamics in
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Fig. 2: The three different communication networks between
which the agents switch.
(17) can be rewritten, for a single agent i ∈ N , as
xi(k + 1) = projΩi
(
(1− qi(k))xi(k) + qi(k)[A(k)]ix(k)
)
.
From this formulation, it is clear how the modification of the
original dynamics (15) results into an inertia of the players
to change their opinion.
We have proven numerically that Assumption 6 is satisfied
and that the unique p-NWE of the game is
x¯ =
[
0.25, 0.25, 0.44, 0.58, 0.49, 0.41, 0.75, 0.75
]>
.
In Figure 3 the evolution players’ opinion are reported, as
expected, the dynamics converge to the p-NWE, i.e., x¯.
Fig. 3: The evolution of the opinion xi(k) of each agent
i ∈ N . The light blue regions represents the local feasible
sets of positive and negative extremists.
C. Distributed LASSO algorithm
The following simulation applies Prox-GNWE to solve a
problem of distributed model fitting. Namely, we develop a
distributed implementation of the LASSO algorithm.
First, we introduce the problem by describing the classical
centralized formulation, for a complete description see [21].
Consider a large number of data y˜ ∈ Rd, where d = 500,
affected by an additive normal Gaussian noise; the true model
that generates them is assumed linear and in the form Bx =
y, where B ∈ Rd×n is the covariate matrix; x ∈ Rn the
real parameters of the model, with n = 6; and y the model
outputs not affected by the noise. Hereafter, the matrix B
is assumed to be known. The algorithm aims to compute
the parameters estimation xˆ ∈ Rn that minimizes the cost
function
f(xˆ) := ‖Bxˆ− y˜‖22 + ‖xˆ‖1 .
We focus now on the distributed counterpart of the LASSO,
already analized in the literature, e.g., see [36]. In our setup,
we assume N = 5 agents, each one measuring a subset y˜i ∈
R100 of y˜, and communicating via a network described by
the adjacency matrix A, satisfying Standing Assumption 3.
Accordingly, each agent i knows the local covariate matrix
Bi ∈ R200×6 associated to the measurements y˜i ∈ R200.
The noise affecting the data set of each agent i, is assumed
Gaussian with zero mean and variance σi. It models the
different precision of each agent in measuring the data.
The variance σi is randomly drawn between [0, σM ]. In the
following, we propose simulations for four different values
of σM , namely 0.5%, 1.25%, 2.5% and 5% of the maximum
value of y, i.e., the values of σM := {1.13, 2.8, 5.6, 11.3}.
We cast the problem as the game in (20), where, for all
agent i ∈ N , the local cost function is fi(xˆi) := ‖Bixˆi −
y˜i‖22 + ‖xˆi‖1, where xˆi is the local estimation of the model
parameters. On he other hand, let xˆ = col((xˆi)i∈N ), then
the aggregative term ‖xˆi −Axˆ‖2 leads to a better fit of the
model, if the weights in the matrix A are chosen inversely
proportional to the noise variance of each agent. To enforce
the consensus between all the local estimations xˆi, i.e., xˆ∗ :=
xˆi(∞) for all i ∈ N , we impose the constraint Lxˆ = 0,
where L := L⊗ In and L is the Laplacian matrix associated
to the communication network. The resulting game can be
solved via Prox-GNWE, that provides a distributed version of
the LASSO algorithm. In particular, it generates a sequence
(xˆ(k))k∈N converging asymptotically to a solution of the
model fitting problem.
In Figure 4, it is shown the trajectory of ‖xˆ(k+1)−xˆ(k)‖‖xˆ(k+1)‖
where xˆ(k) is the collective vectors of the parameters estima-
tions obtained via Prox-GNWE at iteration k; this quantity
describes the relative variation of the estimations between
two iterations of the algorithms. Notice that the sequence
converges asymptotically, but, as expected, a greater noise
variance σM leads to a slower rate of convergence. The
Fig. 4: Trajectory of ‖xˆ(k+1)−xˆ(k)‖‖xˆ(k+1)‖ generated via Prox-
GNWE. The different maximum noise variances σM adopted
identify the different curves.
constraint violation, i.e., ‖Lxˆ(k)‖, at every iteration k of the
algorithm are reported in Figure 5; the constraints fulfilment
is achieved asymptotically. Also in this case, the use of
more noisy measurements y˜ leads to a slower asymptotic
convergence of the local estimations xˆi to consensus.
Fig. 5: Constraint violation ‖Lxˆ(k)‖ of the collective vector
xˆ(k) for each iteration k. The different maximum noise
variances σM adopted identify the different curves.
Finally, for every iteration k, consider the output of the
estimated model yˆi(k) = Bxˆi(k), for all i ∈ N ; the average
of the mean squared values (MSE) of all the local estimations
as is computed as MSE := 1N
∑
i∈N ‖yˆi(k) − y‖2. This
value provide an index of the quality of the estimation. In
Figure 6, we report the normalized MSE for different values
of σM . The increment of σM causes a slower decrement of
the MSE, i.e., a higher number of iterations to achieve a good
parameters estimations. On the other hand, if a small noise
affect the data, already after 1000 iterations the parameters
obtained perform almost as good as the final ones. The
study of this curves emphasises the trade off between a good
parameters estimations and a fast converging algorithm.
Fig. 6: Trajectory of the normalized average MSE of the
estimated model with respect to the real one, for every
iteration k ∈ N. The different maximum noise variances σM
adopted identify the different curves.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
A. Conclusion
For the class of multi-agent games, proximal type dy-
namics converge, provided that they are subject only to
local constraints and the communication network is strongly
connected. We proved that their asynchronous counterparts
also converge, and that they are robust to bounded delayed
information. If each agent has the possibility to arbitrarily
choose the communications weights with its neighbours, then
proximal dynamics converge even if the communication net-
work varies over time. For multi-agent games subject to both
local and coupling constraints, the proximal type dynamics
fail to converge, so we provide a converging iterative algo-
rithm (Prox-GNWE) converging to a normalized-Extended
Network Equilibrium of the game. When the problem at
hand can be recast as a proximal type dynamics, the results
achieved directly provide the solution of the game, as shown
in the numerical examples proposed.
B. Outlook
Although we have analyzed several different setups, this
topic still presents unsolved issues that can be explored in
future research. In the following, we highlight the ones that
we think are the most compelling.
The implementation of the asynchronous version of Prox-
GNWE presents several technical issues. In fact, the operator
in (43), describing the synchronous dynamics, is quasi-NE.
This is a weaker property than NE, thus it does not allow
us to extend the approach used in Section IV-B to create
the asynchronous version of the constrained dynamics, see
[25, Th. 1]. In the literature, there are no asynchronous
algorithms providing convergence for quasi-NE operators,
that translate to implementable iterative algorithms, thus an
ad hoc solution has to be developed. It is interesting to notice,
that in the particular case in which the game is an ordinal
potential game, we can easily show that the asynchronous
constrained dynamics converge asymptotically.
In the case of a time-varying graph, see Section IV-C, we
have supposed that at every time instant the communication
networks satisfies Standing Assumption 3. It can be interest-
ing to weak this assumption by considering jointly connected
communication networks, as done in [27].
One can notice that, if the adjacency matrix is irreducible,
then it is also AVG in some weighted space, see [37, Prop. 1].
The characterization of this space may lead to an extension
of the results presented in this paper, as long as the matrix
weighting the space preserves the distributed nature of the
dynamics.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Firstly, we introduce the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5: Let P ∈ RN×N , [P ]ij := pij be a non negative
matrix that satisfies
P1N = 1N , ⇐⇒
∑
j∈N pij = 1 (30)
q>P ≤ q> ⇐⇒ ∑i∈N qipij ≤ qj , (31)
where q ∈ RN>0. Then P is NE in HQ, with Q = diag(q).
Proof: To ease the notation we adopt
∑
j(·) :=∑
j∈N (·) and
∑
j
∑
k<j(·) :=
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈(1,...,j−1)(·) in
the following.
Next, we exploit (31) to compute
x>P>QPx− x>Px = ∑iqi (∑jpijxj)2 −∑jqjx2j
≤∑iqi (∑jpijxj)2 −∑j∑iqipijx2j
=
∑
iqi
((∑
jpijxj
)2
−∑jpijx2j) .
(32)
Notice that for all i ∈ N it holds∑
jpijx
2
j =
∑
jpij(
∑
kpik)x
2
j ,
furthermore this implies that(∑
jpijxj
)2
−∑jpijx2j = −∑j∑k<jpijpik(xj − xk)2
(33)
Since the matrix P is supposed non negative and from (32)
and (33), it follows that
x>P>QPx− x>Qx ≤ −∑j∑k<jpijpik(xj − xk)2 ≤ 0
Therefore, P is NE in HQ.
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) From Standing Assumption 3, A is marginally stable, with
no eigenvalues on the boundary of the unit disk but semi-
simple eigenvalues at 1. It can be rewrite as A = (1−η)Id+
ηB with η > 1− a, hence B ≥ 0 and is row stochastic. The
graph associated to B has the same edges of the one of A, so
it is strongly connected and consequently B is irreducible.
The PF theorem for irreducible matrix ensures the existence
of a vector q satisfying (31) for B. Therefore, Lemma 5
can be applied to B, implying that B is NE in HQ where
Q = diag(q)  0. By construction, this implies that the
linear operator A is η–AVG in the same space. This directly
implies that A = A⊗In is η–AVG in HQ, with Q = Q⊗In.
(ii) From point (i), we know that A is η–AVG in the space
HQ. Define qi := [Q]ii, since proxfi is FNE in HIn , it holds
that for all x, y ∈ Rn and for all i ∈ N ,
‖proxf¯i(x)− proxf¯i(y)‖In ≤ ‖x− y‖In
− ‖x− y − proxf¯i(x) + proxf¯i(y)‖In
‖proxf¯i(x)− proxf¯i(y)‖qiIn ≤ ‖x− y‖qiIn (34)
− ‖x− y − proxf¯i(x) + proxf¯i(y)‖qiIn .
Grouping together (34), for every the i ∈ N , leads to
‖proxf(x)−proxf(y)‖Q ≤ ‖x− y‖Q−
− ‖x− y − proxf(x) + proxf(y)‖Q ,
(35)
for all x,y ∈ RnN , hence proxf (·) is FNE in HQ. Thus, by
[38, Prop. 2.4], the composition proxf ◦A is AVG in HQ
with constant 12−η .
Finally, if the matrix A is doubly stochastic, then its left
PF eigenvector is 1. Applying the result just attained in (ii),
we conclude that proxf ◦A is η–AVG in HI .
Proof of Theorem 1
From Lemma 1(ii), we know that the operator proxf ◦A is
AVG in HQ with constant 12−η and η > 1−a. Therefore the
convergence proof of the Banach iteration in (7) is completed
invoking [24, Prop. 5.14]. 
Proof of Corollary 1
The convergence follows directly from [24, Prop. 5.15]
and the fact that the considered A is nonexpansive in the
space HQ, by Lemma 5.
B. Proof of Section IV-B
Since dynamics (14) are a particular case to the ones in
(12), we first prove Theorem 3 and successively derive the
proof of Theorem 2 exploiting a similar reasoning.
Proof of Theorem 3
From Theorem 1, we know that the operator T :=
proxf ◦A is η-AVG in the space HQ with η ∈ (1 − a, 1).
Therefore, it can be written as T = (1−η)Id+ηT where T is
a suitable NE operator in HQ. Notice that fix(T ) = fix(T ).
Substituting this formulation of T in (14) leads to
x(k + 1) = x(k) + ψkηζk
(
T − Id)xˆ(k) . (36)
Since T is NE in HQ, [25, Lemma 13 and 14] can be
applied to the dynamics in (36). Therefore, if we chose
ψk ∈
(
0, Npmin(2ϕ√pmin+1)(1−a)
)
, the sequence generated by the
dynamics in (36) are bounded and converge almost surely
to a point x ∈ fix(T ) = fix(proxf ◦A). The proof is
completeds recalling that the set of fixed points of proxf ◦A
coincides with the one of NWE, Remark 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
The dynamics (12) coincide with (14), when ψk = 1
for all k ∈ N, therefore if Npmin(2ϕ√pmin+1)(1−a) > 1, then
the convergence is guaranteed from Theorem 3. From easy
computation it can be seen that this condition is equivalent
to (13), and this conclude the proof.
C. Proofs of Section IV-C
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 4, let us introduce
two preliminary lemmas. The first proposes a transformation
to construct a doubly stochastic matrix from a general row
stochastic matrix.
Lemma 6: Let P := p ∈ RN×N and [P ]ij = pij be a
non negative, row stochastic matrix. If there exists a vector
w ∈ RN≥0 such that w>P = w>, then the matrix
P := I + µ diag(w)(P − I), (37)
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1maxi∈N (1−pii)wi , is non negative and
doubly stochastic. If µ < 1maxi∈N (1−pii)wi , then the diagonal
elements of P are positive.
Proof: Since w is a left eigenvector of P it holds that
w>P = w> . (38)
In order to prove the first part of the lemma we have to show
that P1 = 1 and 1>P = 1>, hence
P1 = 1− µw + µdiag(w)P1 = 1 . (39)
Analogously,
1>P = 1> − µw> + µw>P = 1> , (40)
where the last equality is achieved by means of (38). There-
fore, from (39)–(40) we conclude that P is doubly stochastic.
The diagonal elements of P are pii := 1− µwi + µwipii
the off diagonal ones are instead pij := µwipij , ∀i, j ∈
N . From simple calculations, it follows that if 0 ≤ µ ≤
1
maxi∈N (1−pii)wi then P is a non negative matrix.
If µ < 1maxi∈N (1−pii)wi then pii > 0 for all i ∈ N , hence
P is doubly stochastic and with positive diagonal elements.
In the next corollary we consider the case of a matrix A
satisfying Standing Assumption 3. It shows that the trans-
formation (37) does not change the set of fixed points of A.
Furthermore, it also provides the coefficient of averagedness
of A.
Lemma 7: Let the matrix A satisfies Standing Assump-
tion 3 and Q as in Theorem 1. Then the matrix
A := I +Q(A− I) (41)
is doubly stochastic with self-loops and the following state-
ments hold:
(i) fix(A·) = fix(A·);
(ii) A satisfies Standing Assumption 3;
(iii) A is χ-AVG in H
with χ ∈ (maxi∈N (1− ai,i)qi, 1).
Proof: (i) The definition in (41) is equivalent to A =
(I −Q) +QA. Therefore fix(A) = fix(A), since Q  0.
(ii) The matrix A is in the form of (37) with µ = 1
and, since 1 < 1maxi∈N (1−ai,i(k)) ≤ 1maxi∈N (1−ai,i(k))qi ,
it satisfies the assumption of Lemma 6, thus A is doubly
stochastic with self-loops. Finally, since A satisfies Standing
Assumption 3, the graph defined by A is also strongly
connected, therefore also A satisfies Standing Assumption 3.
(iii) To prove that A is χ-AVG with χ ∈
(maxi∈N (1− ai,i)qi, 1), we can also apply [2, Lem. 9] or
use the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 4
From Corollary 7, each matrix A := I + µQ(k)(A(k)−
I) is (µ(k) maxi∈N (1− ai,i(k))qi(k))-AVG in HI . Since
proxf is FNE in HI , the operator proxf ◦ A(k) is
1
2−ηˆ(k) where ηˆ(k) := µ(k) maxi∈N (1− ai,i(k))qi(k), [38,
Prop. 2.4]. All the operators used in the dynamics are AVG
in the same space HI , therefore the global convergence
follows from [38, Prop. 3.4(iii)], since all the cluster point
of (x(k))k∈N lay in E .
D. Derivation of Prox-GNWE
Here, we propose the complete derivation of Prox-GNWE.
To ease the notation, we define A := B + Id − G, $ :=
col(x(k), σ(k)) and $+ := col(x(k + 1), σ(k + 1)). Con-
sider the following non symmetric preconditioning matrix
Φ :=
[
δ−1 +A −ΛC>
C βIM
]
(42)
where δ := diag((δi)i∈N )⊗ In, δi ∈ R>0 and β ∈ R>0.
The update rule of the modified PPP algorithm [34,
Eq. 4.18], reads as
$˜ = JΦ−1A$ (43a)
$+ = $ + γΦ($˜ −$) (43b)
where JΦ−1A := JU−1(A+S)(Id + U−1S) and γ ∈> 0.
Let us define its self-adjoint and skew symmetric compo-
nents as U := (Φ + Φ>)/2 and S := (Φ− Φ>)/2.
We choose the parameters δ and β to ensure that U  0 and
‖U‖ ≤ γ−1, where γ will be the step–size of the algorithm.
This can be done through the Gerschgorin Circle Theorem
[39, Th. 2]. The resulting bounds are reported in (28).
Remark 4: The set of fixed points of the mapping defining
the whole update in (43a)–(43b), coincides with zer(A), [34,
Proof of Th. 4.2] .
Next, we proceed to compute the explicit formulation of
the algorithm. First, we focus on (43a) , so
$˜ = JU−1(A+S)(Id + U−1S)$ (44a)
$˜ + U−1(A+ S)$˜ 3$ + U−1S$ (44b)
0 ∈ U($˜ −$) +A$˜ + S($˜ −$) (44c)
0 ∈ Φ($˜ −$) +A$˜ (44d)
Solving the first row block of (44d), i.e. 0 ∈ (δ−1 +
A)(x˜ − x) − ΛC>(σ˜ − σ) + F (x˜) + x˜ −Ax˜ + ΛC>σ˜ ,
leads to
0nN ∈ δ−1(x˜− x)−Ax+ ΛC>σ + F (x˜) + x˜
0nN ∈ (δ−1 + I)x˜+ F (x˜)− δ−1x−Ax+ ΛC>σ
with a slight abuse of notation let us define 1
δ−1+1 :=
diag
((
1
δ−1i +1
)
i∈N
)
⊗ In then we obtain
0nN ∈ x˜+ 1δ−1+1F (x˜) + 1δ−1+1
[
ΛC>σ − δ−1x−Ax]
x˜ = J 1
δ−1+1F
(
1
δ−1+1
[
δ−1x+Ax−ΛC>σ]) (45)
The second row block instead reads as 0 ∈ C(x˜ − x) +
β(σ˜ − σ) +NRM≥0(σ˜) + σ˜ − Cx˜+ c, and leads to
0M ∈ −Cx+ β(σ˜ − σ) +NRM≥0(σ˜) + c (46a)
σ˜ = JNRM≥0
(
σ + 1β (Cx− c)
)
(46b)
The final formulation of Prox-GNWE, presented in (27a) –
(27d), is obtained combining (45) and (46b) with (43b).
E. Convergence proof of Prox-GNWE
Also in this case, we first propose an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 8: Let Λ = Q with Q is chosen in accordance
with Theorem 1. Then the mapping Id − G from (26) is
maximally monotone in HQ where Q = diag(Q, IM ).
Proof: The mapping Id−G is monotone if and only if
2Q− (G>Q+QG)  0 (by [40, Lemma 3]).
2Q− (G>Q+QG)  0
2Q−
([
A>Q QC>
−CQ I
]
+
[
QA −QC>
QC I
])
 0[
2Q−
(
A>Q+QA
)
0
0 0
]
 0
(47)
The last inequality in (47) holds if and only if Id − A is
monotone in HQ. The matrix Q is chosen as in Theorem 1,
thus A is η-AVG in HQ with η ∈ (0, 1 − a). From
[24, Example 20.7] we conclude that Id −A is monotone.
Therefore, also Id−G is monotone. Finally, since we consid-
ered a bounded linear operator we conclude the maximally
monotonicity of Id−G in HQ invoking [24, Example 20.34].
Proof of Theorem 5
By Lemma 8, we know that Id − G is maximally mono-
tone. Using a similar reasoning to the one in the proof if
Theorem 1, we conclude that R is firmly nonexpansive in
HQ. The domain of the operator R is the entire space, thus
applying [41, Prop. 23.8(iii)] we deduce that B is maximally
monotone.
The mapping B + Id − G is the sum of two maximally
monotone operators, so [24, Corollary 25.5(i)] ensures the
maximal monotonicity of the sum. The step sizes δ and β
are chosen as in (28), hence U is positive definite.
Applying [34, Th. 4.2] ensures the convergence of the
sequence generated by the update rule (43a) – (43b) to a
point in zer(B + Id − G). The proof is concluded invoking
Lemma 2 and 4. 
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